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    February 25

    Educated cadres facing harsh lessons

    Sitting half in her seat with hands cloaked in ripped sleeves, Wang Caiyue breathed lightly as she waited for her turn to speak. The scene clearly wasn’t what the former English teacher had in mind when she gave up her job in hope of something better in the countryside.

     

    It has been three years since she was installed as Qiuzhuang village’s first college-educated cadre in Pingdingshan city of the central Henan province. Wang learned the names and faces of all 936 local residents, and won their hearts and minds by a rare, sweeping victory in the rural election.

     

    In the words of Qiuzhuang’s Party boss Huang Fawa, on whom Wang’s nervous eyes were fixed, “the girl has become a true local.”

     

    Wang is among the first pioneers of Pingdingshan’s ambitious strategy in 2003 to install a college-educated cadre in each of its 2,637 villages. The city hoped that the move – which many compare to the “zhiqing movement” of the Mao years that sent millions of urban youths to the countryside – would both curb rising unemployment and find fresh blood to stimulate the staggering rural economy.

     

    Pingdingshan became the first city in all of China to realize that goal in 2006, as other cities across the country began to replicate its experience. The central government, too, made it a five-year state project that aims to hire 100,000 to 200,000 college graduates to work in villages nationwide shortly before the financial crisis fell in 2008, leaving millions jobless.

     

    According to official figures, about 1.5 million college graduates were without work at the end of 2008. They are to be accompanied by 6.1 million peers who will enter the job market this year.

     

    Governments at all levels are laying high hopes on the project, which some have come to call the “cunguan (village cadre) movement”. But every hope is accompanied by frustration, even here in Qiuzhuang village, the little-known root of the widely influential zhiqing campaign.

     

    It is plainly impossible for Wang to backtalk Huang, a determined, albeit temperate, 73-year-old who has led the village since 1970. The firm-voiced Party veteran still holds unquestionable authority in Qiuzhuang, and prefers to contextualize her work in – perhaps also unconsciously restrain it to – conventional revolutionary discourse.

     

    “These college graduates who are working as rural cadres are, just like us then, receiving reeducation by the poor and lower-middle peasants in response to Chairman Mao’s call,” Huang told China Daily. “Their work is to unite the masses and develop the economy.”

     

    As one of the last living founders of the zhiqing (literally meaning “educated youths”) identity, Huang, indeed, has every inclination to still think that way.

     

    Huang became one of Dalizhuang township’s first 32 “educated youths” – those who finished at least primary education – during the rural cooperative movement in early 1955. Like most other rural areas at the time, Dalizhuang’s cooperatives severely lacked management and accounting personnel. That was when Huang and the other local “educated youths” were convinced to return to their native villages instead of trying for a shot in the cities.

     

    Dalizhuang’s effort led to almost immediate economic success and, not much later, unprecedented political fame. In July, the township’s experience, summarized by its superior Jiaxian county, reached Chairman Mao Zedong. Mao annotated: “All such intellectuals who could go work in the villages should do so happily. The countryside is a vast land; great accomplishments can be made there.”

     

    Hence began the first tide of the zhiqing movement, one that saw 2.88 million elementary and middle school graduates across the country returning to their native rural lands.

     

    The second tide came in 1968, when Dalizhuang changed its name to “Vast Land and Great Accomplishment” (Guangkuotiandi Dayouzuowei) People’s Commune. A much more organized movement was launched that December, after Mao’s call “It is imperative that educated youth go to the rural areas and be reeducated by the poor and low-middle peasants” spread – and was echoed – all over China.

     

    Around 18 million educated urban youths flooded the villages between 1966 and 1980, when the movement was halted. Huang’s village received 82 zhiqings, while Dalizhuang hosted a total of 830. Vice Premier Li Keqiang’s wife Chen Hong, too, stayed in the commune as a zhiqing for three years.

     

    According to a 1974 documentary on Dalizhuang, the zhiqings “brought knowledge to the villages and sparked rural lives”. Huang, meanwhile, said the movement “has had an apparent impact and (still) has a bright future”.

     

    While linking the current state project with the zhiqing movement, though, Huang does acknowledge that significant differences remain. “Unlike past decades, rural areas today are in dire need of people with college education. Things just don’t click when people don’t have that much education,” he said.

     

    “Economic development is borne out of talents, who are borne out of schools,” Huang stressed.

     

    But development means so much more in today’s rural China, enmeshed between contradicting paths to free its residents from both ill-paid farm work and overtime, under-waged, temporary urban labor.

     

    Wang, now village chief, is keenly aware of it all. She understands the villagers’ urge for wealth and devotes herself to making it happen. But in a market economy, it is no longer possible for today’s rural “educated youths” to return to the villages. Qiuzhuang has 36 university graduates, including four with PhDs or Master’s degrees, but not a single one has returned.

     

    Many local residents are employed by the six village factories, all set up by businessmen from outside the region. Wang has tried to help villagers start their own businesses, but that mission has been much easier said than done.

     

    “We’re sent here to lead the masses to wealth, not receiving reeducation from them,” Wang resisted Huang’s frame of mind in a low tone. “The cunguan movement seeks to strengthen social stability and boost rural economy.”

     

    “After they are promoted, the cadres, with experience at the village level, may be more inclined to draft farmer-friendly policies,” she said.

     

    But there have long been well-founded doubts as to what role these college-educated youths, trapped in trying to balance between the cunguan campaign’s three central missions – resolving urban unemployment, finding capable reserve cadres for the Party, and changing the static, backward face of rural China – can really play during their three-year terms in the village.

     

    Wang’s barriers point to not only inherent rural issues entirely beyond her, but also an implicit local consensus that unless she helps villagers accomplish their common mission – to get rich fast – her role would be constrained as a zhiqing – an assistant, an urbanite, an outsider.

     

    But still, she has had very few complaints. With an annual per capita income of 5,360 yuan (US$ 784), Qiuzhuang’s economy is already profoundly more solid than most of its counterparts in Pingdingshan. Unlike Wang, these other cunguans have run into much deeper problems, ranging from taking sides in local clan clashes and ways to leave – and advance their personal careers.

     

    Li Gang, deputy Party boss of Gaozhuang village in the city’s Zhanhe district, told China Daily “the blessing of local powers” has been his biggest experience after five years of working here.

     

    “No work can really be done here if you can’t develop good guanxi with the Party boss and village chief,” Li, 33, stressed.

     

    Here, as in much of China’s countryside, clans are the de facto ruling force in local affairs. Gaozhuang is dominated by the Gao and Jia families, each trying to oust the other during rural elections through every means possible. The result was a paralyzed system of governance, and a village in piling debt.

     

    Li, an officer with the district’s culture bureau who volunteered to become a cunguan with hopes of fast-tracking his way up the career ladder, has regressed to what he called his “old, laidback self” over the years.

     

    “Any cunguan must first and foremost help keep the local leaders together, do their best to coordinate the relations between the local Party and village committees. They must also be patient at all times, and constantly report to their superiors,” he said.

     

    After spending more than a term in Gaozhuang, Li’s biggest hope has changed from advancing his personal career to merely leaving the village.

     

    “It’s actually okay to work here… but it’s just that in general, all government staff who work as cunguans should be succeeded by non-government workers in the cunguan pool. That hasn’t been the case with me,” he complained.

     

    Li’s worries are shared by many cunguans, who already have stable government posts (or are teachers and doctors), receive a decent pay and are seeking personal gains out of their village experience.

     

    The policies have been “quite unfair” for the non-government workers who volunteered and passed all tests to become cunguans, admitted Chen Xunzhang, head of Pingdingshan’s cunguan office.

     

    Among the cunguans, government officials have a monthly subsidy of more than 2,000 yuan (US$ 292), while those formerly employed by companies earn not even half as much.

     

    Either way, cunguans who finish their service will receive bonus points when they pass the highly competitive national civil servant recruitment exam as well as the national graduate school entrance exams.

     

    But for those who do not intend to become career politicians, preferential policies are still scarce.

     

    “Most of these people aren’t enrolled in the government, were born and raised in the countryside and hold strong social convictions in rural development,” Chen told China Daily.

     

    “I wish we could’ve done more for them, because generally speaking, urban cunguans tend to be spoiled,” he said.

     

    Chen’s office sent an inspection team earlier this year to a village in Pingdingshan’s Ruzhou county. Officials asked five random villagers about the cunguan, a young government staff who had been stationed there since 2007.

     

    As it turned out, none of the villagers knew who he was. The officials turned to the owner of a local market who claimed to know everybody in town. But he, too, had no idea who the cunguan was.

     

    “We’ll have to improve our current mechanisms to ensure a fair environment for all cunguans,” Chen stressed.

     

    But it’s been easier said than done. As a result, the existing administrative framework of cunguans has made selfless devotion from the non-government workers, who have little means of official support, a prerequisite.

     

    A great many villages still lack basic facilities in their rural committee buildings, where the cunguans are required to reside. Most cunguans made office renovation their first and foremost task – Li, for instance, spent more than 40,000 yuan on a new twin bed, a pair of sofas and other gadgets for his small living room.

     

    Only a dedicated few, mostly from the villages, have held on with the most basic living standards. Zhao Xinping, a tall, shy, spectacled man of 31, is most representative of them all.

     

    A rural child, Zhao studied accounting in college and worked in downtown Pingdingshan for 500 yuan a month until Oct 2003, when he heard news of the city’s call for more cunguans.

     

    Zhao turned down his boss, who promised to triple his salary, and wasted no time to volunteer. After passing through several exams, he was sent to Caozhen township in Feb 2004 and settled down in its Yinwang village five months later.

     

    “I grew up in the village, so it was only natural that I come back to one,” he told China Daily.

     

    In five years, the quiet man turned the village upside down. He single-handedly managed to build roughly 5.1 km of cement roads for Yinwang, helped various villagers start their own businesses or find jobs, and always stayed out of trouble.

     

    He sleeps besides a handful of spiders on a half-broken wooden bed with intensely odorous quilts in a shabby, cold office, where the cracking walls are covered with complimentary banners from local residents, an exceptional scene in any village. He grows vegetables outside his office, cooks his own meal, and never asks anything from anyone.

     

    With greasy hair, a pair of dark, muddy, typical 1980s sweaters, pants and shoes, Zhao’s pro-poor attitude and Puritan work ethic has made him the villagers’ man.

     

    Wang Ying, a 63-year-old farmer who rarely picked up his pen after graduating from junior middle school in 1965, was so intrigued that he wrote a report of more than 100,000 words on Zhao’s contributions in the village.

     

    “I intend to write a trilogy,” said Wang, who has spent all his spare time from farming – mostly at night – in the past year and a half on the report.

     

    “He’s too good a cunguan, a comrade, a leader for us,” said Wang, still clearly influenced by his education in the revolutionary years. “Zhao is a 21st Century lighthouse for the world, leading us to the road ahead,” he so proclaimed, exaggeratingly, in typical Cultural Revolution language.

     

    Zhao, for his part, said the cunguan experience has helped him realize his value and truly be with the masses.

     

    “I don’t want to leave,” he said. “As a rural man, I feel especially fulfilled being able to do something for the countryside. I want to do more.”

     

    “My parents hosted zhiqings back in the day, but I think we’re different. Our main task today is development, because development is the cardinal principle,” Zhao said.

     

    But even cunguans like him have not been able to stay oblivious from some of the deeper rural problems.

     

    Zhao received the highest number of votes in the local election last year. But he has not yet sworn in as village chief because, in Wang’s words, “some issues have not been resolved yet.”

    February 24

    Day 3, update on the mine blast in Gujiao

    Poor ventilation and gas management, as well as the lack of on-site supervision and security measures are to blame for Sunday’s fatal gas blast that killed at least 74 people in Shanxi province, preliminary state investigation showed.

     

    “As a major state-owned colliery with relatively sound work safety foundations, this was an accident that never should have occurred for Tunlan mine of the Shanxi Jiaomei Group,” Zhao Tiechui, head of the State Bureau of Coal Industry and deputy chief of the State Council’s probe team, said at an internal conference yesterday.

     

    “The high death toll and severe losses have brought an extremely sharp lesson,” he said.

     

    China Central Television footage showed Shanxi Governor Wang Jun sobbing for nearly a minute during the conference, while apologizing to the relatives of miners killed in the blast.

     

     “The accident has resulted in tremendously bad influence, we’ve let down … the deceased miners and…. their families,” he said.

     

    Wang, former chief of the State Administration of Work Safety, was just elected as governor of the coal-rich province in January. His predecessor Meng Xuenong resigned after 276 people died in the collapse of an unlicensed iron ore reservoir last September.

     

    Sunday’s accident has claimed at least 74 lives. Official figures say 436 miners were at work underground when the blast occurred. The confirmed death toll stood at 44 at 1 pm on Sunday, when Liu Dezheng, deputy director of the Shanxi Work Safety Commission, said 114 people had been hospitalized and 65 remained trapped.

     

    The final official death toll rose to 74 five hours later, when local authorities said all trapped miners “had been found”.

     

    As of today, the number of hospitalized miners remains at 114, an indication that the 30 added casualties between 1 – 6 pm on Sunday were part of the 65 miners trapped underground in Liu’s earlier statement.

     

    Relatives of the men have been urging authorities to locate the whereabouts of the other 35, who were reported to be trapped but then went missing in the final figure. Many complained that the numbers “just don’t add up”.

     

    Three top Tunlan executives were sacked on Monday, the same day the Supreme People’s Procuratorate dispatched investigators to Gujiao to probe on possible breaches of duty by relevant government officials.

     

    The Shanxi Coal Social Security Bureau has already paid 28 million yuan (US$ 4.1 million) to the Xishan Coal Electricity Group, to which Tunlan is a subsidiary, as compensation, according to Xinhua.

     

    Liu earlier said the compensation for each deceased victim would be “no less than” 200,000 yuan (US$ 29,249). But many relatives of the men – mostly housewives or retired workers – are demanding for much more.

     

    Shanxi is set to start a one-year campaign on work safety of state-owned and collectively owned mines on March 1.

     

     

    2月23日,马兰矿招待所后院一层一房间里。我站在中间女家属的背后,露了个脑袋:

    February 23

    Day 2 of mine blast in Gujiao, Shanxi: an update

    GUJIAO, Shanxi: Three heads of the Tunlan Coal Mine were sacked yesterday after a gas blast on Sunday killed at least 74 workers, but the victims’ families, many still with no idea on the whereabouts of their beloved ones, are urging authorities to continue searching underground.
    The mine’s manager, chief safety officer and chief engineer have been removed from their posts amid ongoing investigation, Xinhua reported yesterday without revealing the identity of any of the men.
    The explosion occurred at 2:17 am while 436 miners were at work underground in Gujiao, 60 km west of Taiyuan, capital of the coal-rich Shanxi province.
    Of the more than 300 rescued, 114 miners remained in hospital, five of them in critical condition, Liu Dezheng, deputy director of Shanxi Work Safety Commission, told a briefing yesterday.
    The rescue headquarters announced that all 65 miners trapped in the pit at 1 pm on Sunday "had been positioned" since five hours later, when Liu said rescue work had ended.
    It is still unknown how many of these men are laying underground, in hospital, or dead.
    The official ambiguity has made relatives of the men, who are for the most part given no information as to where the miners are or if they are alive still, anxious.
    The earliest batch of relatives arrived on site around noon Sunday after hearing rumors about the blast. They were then sent to - and mostly contained in - six or seven different hotels, motels and hostels, each closely guarded by a band of earnest mine staff and press officers.
    About 50 people were sent to a shabby two-storey brick hostel of the Malan coal mine, also one of the nine collieries of the Xishan Coal and Electricity Power Company besides Tunlan here in the deep mountains of Gujiao. 
    Upon learning news of the accident, 42-year-old Li Wuzhong’s elder brother directly headed out from home and jumped onto a bus for the 200-km journey from Changzhi, their hometown in southern Shanxi, to the Tunlan Mine.
    He was sent to - or "advised to stay in", as a local officer put it - the Malan hostel before noontime yesterday. 
    “I’ve been told that Li’s unit was down in the pit when the explosion happened,” the elder brother, 53, said.
    Li’s other ten relatives, all men, travelled along. Having been told to wait in the twin-room, they each complained about the scant information of their beloved family member, but all in sheer calmness.
    “No one told me whether he is still alive or not,” Li’s elder brother told China Daily.
    The men tried their best to refrain from breaking into tears, a common scene in all the other 18 rooms on the hostel's second floor, temporarily occupied by mostly frustrated wives, sisters and mothers.
    Accompanying them was a handful of nurses, each equipped with oxygen vases and first-aid kits, ready to treat those who collapse in crying.
    In this hostel filled with too much sorrow and grief, the nurses were constantly at work.
    About 20 employees of the mine - mainly women - were also there, pacifying the relatives, all the while preventing them from breaking out of the hostel. A hospital, where an undisclosed number of rescued miners were being treated and another group of the men's corpses were stored, was within walking distance.
    At about 3 pm yesterday, a mine staff surnamed Liu, a slim, almost pale, spectacled short man in his early 30s, reassured the families that the search for trapped miners was still going on.
    But in fact, no rescue work was conducted from morning onwards, according to on-site observations by China Daily.
    Even before told about the status of her elder brother, Wei Baoying, 38, already began to prepare meat offerings for his funeral.
    "Let's see... I still have apples, cakes and some wine," she murmured to herself while staring dully at the ceiling.
    Back in Tunlan, half a dozen ambulances stood parked outside the pit. A dozen policemen guarded the gates into the shaft, as cleaners behind them swept up around the two stone lions marking the entrance to the mine.
    An unnamed captain of the special police unit from Taiyuan, who arrived on Sunday morning, said they would not leave until the compensation for each victim was confirmed and the investigation process ended.
    He said he was involved in many similar tasks and had seen the rage with which some relatives would protest, normally over scant compensation when accidents took place in small, mostly illegal collieries.
    “But this time, I don’t think there would be any protest,” the captain said, stressing that the Tunlan Mine "belongs to one big state-owned firm with lots of money".
    Without any accident reported in the past five years, Tunlan, with an annual capacity of 5 million tons, is considered one of the safest and most advanced mines in Shanxi.
    Officials have said the compensation for each dead miner would be “no less than 200,000 yuan (US$ 29,000)”.
    They also said the reason for the blast was under investigation.
    A statement posted on the provincial government website said final checks on the mine were being conducted.
    "The next step is to double-check the bottom of the well ... treat the injured and properly save all the data files in preparation for the investigation," it said.

    山西古交,瓦斯事故,两天两夜,边城散记

    昨日下午,和紧跟领导的媒体大部队自觉走散,一人苦守屯兰矿边数小时,得到不少其他媒体并未在意的消息。月华初上时,慢慢踱步到矿边五百米的网吧上网,字字修改同事细心编写的稿子。改完已经十一点多,继续慢慢步行回城。一条大路直通山下,倒真不必担心迷路。只是两旁灌木横刀而立,四下全无灯火,野狗不时猛叫,偶有山涧潺潺,环境苍茫诡异,与加西美东全然两样风貌。起重机千人一面,运煤车一路驰骋,夜黑风高,震人心魄。
     
    警车是马路的中心,而指挥部的中心想来是即将或已经降临的国家副总理张德江。感谢海洲耐心地陪我聊天,让我度过最黑暗难熬的二十分钟山路,包括帮我在山间正确指出回城的方向。一个多小时后,终于来到所谓指挥部招待所的焦煤集团招待所,辗转之后,安然入睡。
     
    今日事一言难尽。总之,被认作下井矿工开拓一队魏宝军表弟,注册姓名李方超,与部分矿工家属被十数名态度良好的“工作人员”半软禁在马兰矿招待所后院一层达半日之久,其后赴医院太平间认领遗体未遂。
     
    这真是一场奇异的征程,就像人生,恨长苦短。悲乎幸乎,从前夜到今朝,多少矿工兄弟已悄然提前驶完全程。祝你们走好。
     
    当然,死者长已矣,活人事没完。昨夜来信的同志又来短信:“监控队事矿调度及安全的手臂和眼睛。矿井下面的瓦斯风流量在矿调度指挥台上全部可以看到和报警。这次事故为什么?????……监控队在采区办公楼一层东面。”
     
    这事没完。
    February 22

    山西古交:一封短信

    胡记者,你好!你守在井口采访没意义,你要采访监控队,那么多的全自动监控设备为什么不报警?在这个问题中,就有这次矿难的真正答案。死难的弟兄们会感谢你的。

    Live update from the deadly mine blast in Gujiao, Shanxi

    Can't be done without Zhang Haizhou's selfless assistance...

    GUJIAO, Shanxi: At least 74 miners died and an uncertain number of others still trapped underground - and feared dead - after a gas blast early yesterday at one of China’s safest collieries in Shanxi province.

    The blast occurred at 2:17 am while 436 employees of the Tunlan Coal Mine were at work underground in Gujiao city, 60 km west of Taiyuan, capital of the coal-rich province.

    Aside from the dead, 114 miners were hospitalized, of which 26 were in critical condition as of last night.

    Rescue work officially ended as of 6 pm yesterday. Rescue headquarters confirmed that the death toll stood at 74, without announcing the number of miners still trapped - or whether anyone is still trapped at all.

    In any event, the actual number of casualties may still rise. Earlier reports in the afternoon by Xinhua, which put the number of deaths at 44, said at least 65 miners remained trapped underground.

    No official explanation on the confusion has been offered.

    Three days before the blast, Wang Jun, governor of Shanxi, just warned the province “had run out of tears to shed” when reviewing local work safety situations during a conference in Taiyuan.

    By the pit where life and death parted here deep in the mountains, an anonymous recorder on duty at the mine recalled that the first batch of rescuers reached the site at around 3:20 am.

    A total of 57 rescuers, some from other places including Taiyuan, worked in the pit during the half-day rescue phase, according to a local police officer.

    But Gujiao residents said the number was far from enough.

    “The rescue team here with the mine has been severely understaffed, as its mother company is based in Taiyuan,” nearby villager and former Tunlan miner Kang Changqing told China Daily.

    Though his Liangzhuang village sits 3.5 km away, Kang, 46, said people there were the first to find out about the blast and call police.

    “Two intakes of the pit were built by the road just outside my home in Liangzhuang," he said, noting that most villagers were woke up by “two tremendous explosions” at around 2:18 am.

    As the explosions took place more than 400 meters deep underground, mine watchers were not the first to find out about the accident, according to other villagers.

    “The part of the intakes above ground was totally destroyed. Luckily for us, the explosions happened at night when no one was around,” Kang said.

    The current death toll suffices to make this the most lethal accident reported in China's disaster-prone mining industry since 276 people died in the collapse of an unlicensed iron ore reservoir last September, also in Shanxi.

    President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao issued instructions to do everything possible to save those still trapped inside the mine, state television reported.

    Earlier reports said that more than 300 miners escaped alive.

    Most of the miners who rushed to hospital after the accident had suffered carbon monoxide poisoning, Xinhua said, citing doctors at the Xishan Hospital of Coal and Electricity.

    A photo posted online showed one of the survivors, apparently unconscious and with a blackened face, being rushed to medical treatment.

    After climbing out of the deadly pit, the rescuers, some with a cellphone on each hand, wasted no time to call their homes.

    “If I don’t call them immediately, they would start worrying about my safety and mental health," a rescuer surnamed Zhao told China Daily. "My family may think I've gone crazy after being through all this every time," he said.

    Zhao, part of the provincial mine rescue team, began work immediately after reaching the pit in the morning and did not came out from underground till 5:30 pm.

    “Seeing horrific things – that’s just about what my daily life is like. Higher officials may never see things I see,” he added, pointing at the temporary rescue command centre.

    The Tunlan mine, which has an annual capacity of five million tons, is operated by the Shanxi Jiaomei Group. With no accidents reported over the past decade, it is considered one of the safest and most advanced mines in the province.

    A total of 3,786 coal miners died in gas blasts, floods and other accidents in 2007 as companies, often flouting safety regulations, rushed to feed demand from a booming economy.

    The number of coal-related deaths fell to roughly 3,200 last year, after thousands of small, mostly unlicensed mines across the country were closed.

    February 19

    抗旱笔记:旱灾暴露的农村难题

    才从河南平顶山调查抗旱形势回来几天。今年粮价的确不会有太大波动,但农村的其他问题,都在旱情面前暴露无遗。
     
    粮价不会有大变化是因为连续五年丰收。不少农民家里储粮可以支撑一年左右;换句话说,哪怕今年粮食绝收,也能保证自家口粮。正是出于这样的考虑,很多农户都不到地里浇麦。而且耕地又少(河南农民平均1.1亩,比全国人均还少),种地成本又高(种子、化肥、农药,还不算人工),粮价又低(小麦7-8毛),劳动力又少(都外出打工去了,很多农活都得雇人来干),浇麦条件又不具备(一眼井最多对应2-3个水泵,理想状态下,每30-40亩地就应有一眼井。但改革开放以来水利工程无人组织无人管理无人修整无人过问,很多地方是100多亩地才对应一眼井,这一眼井还通常是主席时代打的,年久失修,难以使用;又由于地方败政,修新井、造支渠、买水泵的中央应急资金很少发放到位,造成想浇麦的农民也只能等着借泵;临近水库的还好些,但全省都少有七十年代以后修建的水库,现有的不是亟需修护,就是蓄水量低),浇麦又费钱(柴油、电费、人工)。再加上小农意识的自然复兴(靠天吃饭,天不下雨,咱没办法),结果就是很多地都荒了,大家重又出门打工。哪怕是节前失业的农民工,也宁愿在县城里做一天40-50块钱的建筑工,而不种地。

    如果这样发展下去,广大赋闲在家的农村地区老弱病残,将越来越没有能力承担起扛在肩头的发展重担。如果不能切实提高农民的种粮积极性,农村的自主发展和稳定势必将永远是一句空话。河南仍在从事农业生产的有1500万人,按现在的机械化水平,省里的官员说已经只需要1000万人了。另外的500万人干嘛去呢?那1000万人也不种地了的话,他们干嘛去呢?农民都不种地,咱们又吃啥去呢?如果不组织起来,谁还能有光明的未来呢?
    February 11

    Drought report from Pingdingshan, Henan: Feb 11, 2009

    In many parts of northern China, light rain and all-out efforts at various levels of the administration have helped ease the country’s worst drought in half a century. Reports of constant central, provincial and municipal inspections, military involvement in and local incentives for irrigation activities, as well as heartbroken farmers determined to save their harvest have flooded the media.

     

    But all is quiet on the battlefront in central Henan, a worst hit region in the unprecedented dry spell that, as of Monday, had hit 136 million mu (9.1 million hectares) of winter wheat in eight major producing provinces, while leaving 3.5 million people and 1.66 million livestock with no access to drinking water.


    Scenes of farmers and soldiers irrigating the fields round the clock, trying every bit to secure another summer harvest by using water pumps bought with central emergency funds and advice from upper level inspectors are nowhere to be found in most of Pingdingshan, a city that boasts rich water resources.

     

    Rarely anyone could be seen working on the winter wheat fields across Pingdingshan’s vast countryside, where the local water resources chief has said only 65 percent of its 3.06 million (204,000 hectares) of farmland can be irrigated “no matter what we do”.

     

    “The fields that could’ve been saved have been saved,” said farmer Gao Junhui as he sat in a tiny wooden chair, looking after the water pump at work amidst the fields in Gaozhuang village.

     

    “The battle is done,” Gao, 37, said as he covered himself in smoke clouds. The central authorities earlier warned that the drought may continue until March, and called for persistent efforts in the combat against it.

     

    But residents like Guo have already done their best with what they have. After all, they not only are irrigating the fields at the request of village cadres, but also do have the water resources – and machinery – for the task.

     

    Still, deputy village Party chief Li Gang complained that he had to spend days “through loud speakers in just about every field” getting farmers to irrigate. “Only a few were willing,” he said.

     

    A 1.5 hours’ drive northwest takes one to Ruzhou County, where about 1 million people – more than 90 percent of them farmers – reside. Full of plains and hills, Ruzhou was the earliest county in all of Pingdingshan to start drought relief work.

     

    “We borrowed more than 1 million tons of water from reservoirs in nearby counties,” said Han Jianguo, deputy chief of local water resources. “Two of our four medium reservoirs are dried up, as are 17 of the 26 small ones.”

     

    Ruzhou started drought relief before Christmas and has managed to irrigate about 550,000 mu, or all of its plain fields, once.

     

    When it came to a second time, though, the county ran out of water.

     

    Angou Reservoir, one of Ruzhou’s largest reservoirs, has a water storage capacity of 9 million tons. But when diversion started on Dec 20, its water reserves totaled a mere 1.9 million tons, the lowest level in history.

     

    With only 200,000 tons of water now, Angou, as with all other local reservoirs – each built no later than the 1970s – is used up. Its reservoir banks have become a favorite playground for young couples and children.

     

    “I think the irrigation thus far is enough,” said Han, who has long given up on watering the other 35 percent of Ruzhou’s drought-hit wheat fields in the terrains. “Rain would be a bonus. But realistically speaking, drought conditions can’t be resolved unless with one-time rainfall of at least 15 mm.”

     

    Although Henan received an average rainfall of 6 mm over the weekend, Pingdingshan’s share was no more than 4 mm.

     

    Provincial inspectors have come to call Ruzhou’s relief work “a top model in Henan”. Elsewhere in Pingdingshan and much of the province, especially throughout rural areas near hills and mountains, securing drinking water for local residents has emerged as the focus of drought relief instead of irrigation.

     

    Many, if not most of the young migrant workers have already left these areas after the Lunar New Year Holiday, some returning to their old jobs, others seeking for new ones amidst the deepening economic crisis.

     

    Seniors, women and children have stayed behind, trying to buy enough water for themselves while waiting for the drought to end.

     

    It may seem natural – at least in these mountainous regions – that human’s survival needs are put before irrigation of crops in times of disaster. But even out on the plain fields, where water resources are much more abundant, many farmers have chosen to just wait it out.

     

    Everyone has their own theory in telling the universal nature of their issues.

     

    For farmer Zhang Shufeng in Yexian county, the lack of irrigation facilities is to blame for his unwillingness to irrigate on time. “We’ve got only 20 wells in all of 1,800 mu of farmland, and many haven’t been fixed since the 1970s,” he told China Daily just before the rain on Saturday.

     

    Hundreds of meters away stood Zhang’s fellow villager Mao Qi, who was only too eager to irrigate his own field after he managed to borrow water pumps from the county on Friday.

     

    “I eat and sleep on the fields; otherwise someone might come steal the pumps,” the 69-year-old said. “I’ve been meaning to irrigate the fields sooner, but the pumps weren’t available then.”

     

    Premier Wen Jiabao confirmed on Saturday that Henan had been allocated more than 60 million yuan (US$ 8.8 million) of the total 400 million yuan (US$ 58.5 million) worth of drought relief funds. But Tianzhuang village Party chief Li Derong claimed that he had never seen a penny.

     

    “Not only that, the county has said only those who buy pumps from their agricultural equipment company qualify for a 320-yuan discount per pump,” he said. “But their pumps are bad in quality and come in only one size.”

     

    “It’s so unfair,” he murmured. “All we want is stuff that truly benefits.”

     

    Kong Weiping, a migrant worker whose family in the countryside of eastern Henan’s Shangqiu city has refused to irrigate their wheat fields, said China must find effective ways to convince farmers to grow crops again.

     

    “The cost of growing crops is high enough; add that to the cost for irrigation, and the fact that farmers only have so much field to work with,” Kong, 34, said.

     

    An average Chinese farmer has about 1.38 mu of arable land; every Henan farmer has even less, with 1.1 mu. At around 70 – 80 cents per 500 grams, each mu of wheat earns them at best 700 – 800 yuan a year, not including the cost for fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and labor.

     

    In comparison, work in construction – along with many other short-period jobs available in any township – promises at least 40 yuan of fast cash a day.

     

    Irrigation for each mu means more than 2 hours’ work with a diesel engine. Farmers could borrow the engine and hire others to irrigate the field for them, but both come at a price, as does the diesel itself.

     

    A report last Friday by Henan’s Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters estimated that the average cost for irrigating 1 mu of wheat field once totaled around 15 yuan. The drought conditions, it said, require the fields to be irrigated at least four times.

     

    In other words, Henan will have to spend 3 billion yuan on electricity and diesel needed for effective, full irrigation alone, according to Xinhua.

     

    Aside from a low grain price, the lack of fields and the high cost in growing crops, China’s five consecutive years of good harvest meant that nearly every rural household is stuffed with grain storage.

     

    “The farmers have managed to feed themselves very well, so they don’t really care about growing crops anymore,” said a local press officer who refused to be named. “They’ll manage even if there is no harvest at all this year.”

     

    But that’s something the central authorities least want to hear.

     

    Henan produces a quarter of China’s wheat. It gives around 15 billion kg of wheat to other provinces every year, and saves about 35 billion kg to feed its own population – standing at more than 100 million.

     

    Around 15 million of Henan’s rural residents are engaged in agriculture, while 21 million people work away from home, according to Lu Zhihua, a division chief of the provincial labor and social security department.

     

    But the province only needs 10 million people toiling in the fields, Lu said.

     

     

      

    February 08

    Drought update: Feb 8, 2009 from Pingdingshan, Henan

    PINGDINGSHAN, Henan: Wang Meilian’s wheat field had been without water for more than 110 days, but she managed to keep looking on the bright side. “I thought the rain would eventually come,” the 45-year-old said. “There’s always some rain.”

     

    Although Henan, her home province, is suffering the worst drought in half a century with a 90 percent drop in average rainfall since last November, Wang said she was never too afraid.

     

    Her native Pingdingshan city boasts itself rich in black (coal), white (salt) and blue (water) resources. As the dry spell spread over town, so did relief efforts by local cadres and residents. And with widespread fog since early Saturday, meteorological reports of a rainfall that evening and local preparation of artificial precipitation, it was only natural for the villager to assume all was going to be well.

     

    But when Wang woke up with no sight of rain on Sunday outside her house, she realized the time to irrigate the fields was now or never.

     

    “We started at six am,” she said in the winter chill, watching her 15-year-old son taking a turn to irrigate their field with a water pipe. “The rain would’ve saved us a lot of effort. But it hasn’t been of much help, and forecasts are now saying it’s going to be sunny again from tomorrow on.”

     

    “It’s not that we just wanted to wait for the rain,” she said. “It was too cold in the past few months. And since drought relief work started, it’s been difficult to borrow water pumps.”

     

    While slight showers and artificial precipitation brought on average 0.5 mm of rainfall to 17 counties and cities in Henan yesterday, Pingdingshan received virtually no rain at all.

     

    “About half of our wheat will be lost this year no matter what we do,” local water resources chief Dong Fagen told China Daily. “And to be very frank, we can only manage to irrigate at best 2 million mu (133,333 hectares) of Pingdingshan’s total 3.06 million mu (204,000 hectares) of farmland.”

     

    “The rest is up to Mother Nature,” he said.

     

    Residents like Wang, who live on plain fields where water has never been a real problem, perhaps do need the ubiquitous government banners that read “Meteorological sources say there won’t be rain in nearly a month” and “Irrigation is the only way to ensure summer harvest” to be reminded that Mother Nature isn’t always on the gentle side.

     

    But all those who live in the deep terrains a dozen km down southwest are born to know right from wrong. Here, in Liwuzhuang and a handful of other villages in Bao’an township, water has been a headache for more than 30 years.

     

    “All seven small local reservoirs were built in the late 1950s, when we could still grow rice here. But one broke after another after the Reform and Opening Up, and nobody took care of them,” said village Party chief Gao Hai.

     

    “The nearest reservoir’s strobe has been broken for 30 years. With it fixed, we could’ve irrigated all of our 3,250 mu of crops for three times,” he said.

     

    “But now, five of the seven reservoirs are dried up, and so are all five of our main riverways.”

     

    Local residents have neither tap water nor water from wells as deep as 70 to 80 meters. Drinking water has to be bought from a nearby village for 50 yuan (US$7.3) per three tons.

     

    “We have to ensure drinking water first,” said villager Gao Guobin. “Plus, it’s no use irrigating the fields now anyway… rain can’t be a cure anymore here.”

     

    “A stretch of normal wheat has about 20 rootstalks. But even the good ones here now have only two to three left,” he said.

     

    Like many in Liwuzhuang, the 60-year-old’s 13 mu of crops are all dried. People have given up on saving the fields and returned to work – mostly as migrant labor across the country. Those who lost their jobs in the deepening financial crisis, too, have left for the cities again.

     

    All across the countryside, trees are being planted atop dry wheat and rape plants as villagers seek for desperate alternatives.

     

    About 2.8 million hectares of wheat fields in Henan have been hit by the drought, including 470,000 that are severely damaged, according to Xinhua.

     

    The foul weather had brought water shortages for 420,000 people and 90,000 heads of livestock across the province.

     

    Henan grows a tenth of China’s crops.